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Abstract—Spacecraft are generally protected from a direct 
strike by launch the vehicle and ground structures, but protocols 
to evaluate the impact of nearby strikes are not consistent.   
Often spacecraft rely on the launch vehicle constraints to trigger 
a retest, but launch vehicles can typically evaluate the impact of a 
strike within minutes while spacecraft evaluation times can be on 
the order of hours or even days.   For launches at the Kennedy 
Space Center where lightning activity is among the highest in the 
United States, this evaluation  related delay could be costly with 
the possibility of missing the launch window altogether.  This 
paper evaluated available data from local lightning 
measurements systems and computer simulations to predict the 
coupled effect from various nearby strikes onto a typical payload 
umbilical.  Recommendations are provided to reduce the typical 
trigger criteria and costly delays. 
Keywords—nearby lightning; coupling; ring criteria; 
spacecraft; launch complex; transmission line matrix method; 
I. INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1) 
The launch vehicle industry has been historically reliant on 
launch complex systems and launch weather constraint to 
prevent direct lighting attachment.  Accordingly, the focus for 
lighting effects protection is on nearby strikes and direct strikes 
to the vehicle support structure/facility.  It is important to well 
characterize the launch vehicle immunity to this lightning 
environment.  Although simulation tools and measurement 
options exists, lightning evaluation criteria based on coupling 
to a simple loop is used to allow for crisp go, no-go, and retest 
decision points once the vehicle is on stand.   This paper 
compares these typical back-of-the-envelope (BoE) loop 
induced currents to electromagnetic full wave simulations and 
available measured data.  The calculations are based on 
magnetic induction of voltage and current equations performed 
with classical electromagnetics theory where the open circuit 
voltage and short circuit loop current are given by (1).  

Where  ,  = BA, L is the loop inductance and  B = 
µH.  The magnetic field, H, is derived from the current 
magnitude of the lightning strike with assumed reference 
waveform given in MIL-STD-464for the A component.  This  
is based on i(t) = I0(ε-αt- ε-βt) where the time, t, is in seconds and 
the constants for the A component waveform are α = 11,354 
and β= 647,267 [1,2]. 
Another method is to use mutual inductance coupling [5-6] 
as shown in (2) [5,6].  
Iloop = I(Lm/Ls 
Where I is the current magnitude of the lightning strike, Lm 
is the mutual inductance between the conductor and the loop 
and Ls is the loop self-inductance.  In [6] this mutual 
inductance method was found to be representative of the 
magnitude of a strike for a loop 1 meter away and a 0.454 µs 
rise time.  In this paper both methods and simulations are 
examined for launch vehicle representative cases. 
A brief discussion of the evaluation process is provided 
followed by comparisons between this process and measured 
or simulated data.  Additional simulations are performed to 
evaluate the shielding launch complex structures.  Finally 
recommendations on trigger criteria for retest procedures are 
made.  Since common mode to differential mode coupling and 
shield transfer impedance are widely varying factors in such 
analysis, the current coupled in the loop will be used to 
compare the models, measured data, and calculated levels.    
II. LIGHTNING CRITERIA 
A. Launch Vehicle  
Transient testing is typically performed at the equipment 
level to characterize the vehicle immunity to induced currents 
and voltages.  MIL-STD-461 and RTCA_DO-160 provide 
industry lightning transient immunity tests [1,7].   The 
lightning magnitude and location data is available from the 
launch site or range and includes the lightning magnitude and 
location either though on-site systems such as Cloud-to-
Ground Lightning Surveillance System (CGLSS) or through 
national lightning measurement systems such as the National 
Lightning Detection Network (NLDN) [8].  Note the accuracy 
of these systems vary and should be accounted for the in the 
retest criteria.  An analysis is performed using the range data 
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for a 99th percentile strike of 200 kA, umbilical loop size and 
vehicle immunity data to develop the outer boundary of 
concern.  Then inner boundaries are established for the more 
likely lower magnitude strikes.  These boundaries are often 
formed by the radius around the launch vehicle and are referred 
to as rings.  The criteria are set conservatively with worst case 
coupling to the loop too add confidence during real-time retest 
decisions.  When violations occur, the launch vehicle providers 
have set retest procedures to evaluate the most sensitive 
circuits and can be “launch ready’ within a short window. 
Retest decisions are made by applying range data to a ring 
criterion; however, range data is not infallible. When a strike is 
recorded there are uncertainty levels associated with the data, 
±500m from the recorded distance and ±35%kA of the 
measured flash magnitude [14]. Evaluating the worst case 
scenarios based on these uncertainties yields a very 
conservative estimate, possibly leading to unnecessary retest 
and a missed launch opportunity. An alternate approach, 
employing statistical analysis, should be considered. Table 1 
includes standard deviations of these uncertainties propagated 
through a typical data reduction equation using the Monte 
Carlo Method. The standard deviations below are calculated 
from the BoE B-field equation (1). These uncertainties are still 
conservative due to the use of the 99th percentile 200kA strike 
in the calculation. While this table is clearly not a replacement 
for range data, such as a current monitor, it could prove useful 
for a quick BoE calculation, evaluating individual ring criteria, 
and determining the validity of a simulation.    
TABLE I.  STANDARD DEVIATION USING B-FIELD EQN. 
Standard Deviation (σ) of Current (A) for a 200kA 
Strike 
Distance B-Field 
Method (σ) 
Uncertainty (95% 
confidence) 
4km 3.0 ±6.0 A 
3km 4.5 ±9.0 A 
2km 7.0 ±14.0 A 
1km 24.0 ±28.0 A 
a. Assuming a Gaussian distribution, the uncertainty is ±2σ with 95% confidence. 
B. Spacecraft 
Spacecraft on the other hand typically do not characterize 
their transient immunity by test other than to the typical load 
switching transients that are tested in MIL-STD-461.  The 
payload umbilical is typically the highest umbilical on the 
launch platform and hence has the worst case loop area for 
induced currents and voltages.  The spacecraft only flies once 
and thus does not have lightning sensitive circuit based retest 
procedures established.  Instead, the spacecraft relies on full 
system retest checks which can take many hours or days to 
complete.  Performing a worst case coupling analysis can lead 
to over prediction of the impact and thus lost launch 
opportunities.  Hence, we are evaluating typical spacecraft 
configurations to provide additional resources and techniques 
to evaluate the impact of a nearby strike on the sensitive 
equipment housed inside the spacecraft. This is not to say that 
a retest should be avoided, especially after a strike very near 
the launch site because the safety and functionality of the 
spacecraft are of the utmost importance. These 
recommendations are designed to allow the spacecraft provider 
to make their own assessment on a retest decision rather than 
following a blanket conservative criterion established without 
any knowledge of the equipment in question. 
III. SIMULATION COMPARISONS 
All simulations were performed using the hexahedral mesh 
transmission line matrix solver in CST [9].  This option allows 
for circuit layout and grounding modifications of the umbilical 
cable.  Comparisons were made with regard to distance from 
the strike, rise time, and cable layout. Currents in CST were 
taken from the over braid of a simulated cable bundle.  
A. Distance comparisons 
The standard model distance used in this study was 500 
meters.  Typically, strikes closer than this distance would be a 
direct strike to the launch support or lightning protection 
structure simply because it would be the tallest structure within 
that radius.  However, to evaluate the sensitivity of simulations 
and lightning criteria equations have to the distance from the 
strike parameter, closer and further distances were used and 
compared with both BoE equations. The results in Table II 
reveal a correlation between the model and equation across the 
range of distances with some systematic error. It is worth 
noting that all of the values fall nearly within the uncertainties 
established in Table I, showing the utility of a modeling effort 
and statistical analysis. As with the uncertainties in Table I this 
comparison indicates a larger margin of error for closer strikes. 
TABLE II.  CST AND B-FIELD EQN. CURRENTS ON A STANDARD 
LOOP 
Comparison of Current 
Distance CST Peak 
Current  
Eqn. (1) 
Current  
Eqn. (2) 
Current 
4km 9.5 A 15.1 A 16.6 A 
3km 8.5 A 20.1 A 22.1 A 
2km 19.0 A 30.2 A 33.1 A 
1km 37.0 A 60.4 A 66.2 A 
 
B. Waveform comparisons 
The rise time typically assumed for the ring criteria is 
6.4x70 µs based on MIL-STD-464 lightning definition for 
the initial stroke. That standard rise time was used in all of 
these simulations unless noted otherwise. In order to 
evaluate the coupling into a 150m2 cable loop for different 
waveforms, the rise times were extrapolated from the 
double exponential constants (α and β from MIL-STD-
464) and compared with CST simulations.  The results in 
Table III show that the performance is similar in the two 
BoE methods because they are both based on the peak 
level and not the rise time.  Comparison to the simulation 
shows that the BoE methods remain conservative except 
for the faster H component.  Since strikes with magnitudes 
of concern will likely be component A or D waveform, the 
BoE equations bound the simulation. 
TABLE III.  WAVEOFRM VS CURRENT ON A 150M2 LOOP 
Waveforms Coupling at 500m 
Waveform 
(MIL-STD-464)  
CST 
Current 
Eqn. (1) 
Current 
Eqn. (2) 
Current 
H: 0.25x4.5 µs 32 A 7.7 A 7.5 A 
D: 3.2x35 µs 79 A 77 A 77 A 
Ah: 5x50 µs 89 A 115 A 116 A 
A: 6.4x70 µs 100 A 153 A 154 A 
 
C. Cable layout and grounding 
The standard ring criterion assumes the entire length of the 
loop made by the height of the umbilical cable, the rocket, 
the support structure and the ground.  If details of the 
configuration aren’t known, it is common to use the cable 
lengths to define the loop.  This can lead to an 
overestimation of the currents when the cables are 
drooped. Three loop configurations with different areas 
were modeled and compared with equation (1): 1500m2, 
150m2, and a drooped cable of the same length as the 
150m2 configuration with an effective area of 105m2. The 
B-field equation takes into account the area of the loop and 
the magnetic flux, thus it is the equation used to calculate 
the values in Table III. Note that the inductance equation 
does not account for the difference between the small and 
drooped loops because the cable lengths are the same; 
however, there is a clear reduction in current for the 
smaller area, shown in both the BoE calculation and 
simulations.   
TABLE IV.  LOOP AREA VS CURRENT.  
CST vs BoE for Various Areas 
Area  CST Current  (1) Current   Image 
1500 m2 267 A 1390 A 
 
150 m2 100 A 153 A 
 
105 m2 61 A 97 A 
 
 
The area reduction due to some amount of slack in the cable is 
not a negligible difference and should be taken into account to 
improve the accuracy of hand calculated results and modeling.   
 
IV. FACILITY SHIELDING 
When lighting protection systems are in place, significant 
additional benefit can be achieved from shielding from 
electromagnetic waves afforded by these facilities.  
A. Facility Shielidng 
Most launch vehicles at KSC are in enclosed buildings with 
large openings for vehicle roll-out to a launch pad.  A typical 
structure housing a launch vehicle is made of steel.  The energy 
propagating from the attachment point will couple to such 
structures resulting in some dB reduction in field and current 
levels measured within the building. The shielding 
effectiveness (S.E.) of such a steel building is discussed in [11] 
and validated through CST models and a comparison with 
range data. The study estimated the reduction due to the 
structure at 45dB and 46dB in the E-field and H-field 
respectively.  Figures 1 and 2 are modeled to investigate the 
same phenomenon yielding results of -45dB and -39dB in the 
E-field and H-field respectively. This shielding may be applied 
to results derived from a model (excluding the presence of a 
building) or BoE equation to account for the significant 
reduction provided by the enclosure in order to calculate a 
value that reflects the conditions of the launch environment.  
 
Fig. 1.  Steel Building E-Field S.E. 
 Fig. 2.  Steel Building H-Field S.E. 
Finally, to validate the results, data from a current monitor 
inside of a typical steel building was compared with a model of 
the strike occurring at the same time signature without the 
structure present. The loop area used in the BoE calculations in 
Table V was ~450m2 the other data was taken from range 
reports that recorded the lightning events.  The average 
difference between the current monitor and the predictive 
model was about -40dB of current (calculated from the results 
in Table V), this is in good agreement with the predictions in 
[11]. Although many other local flashes were recorded, no 
currents were reported on the umbilical during those events, 
showing the significant attenuation provided by the enclosure. 
Applying reductions of  -30dB (-25dB for a very conservative 
estimate) to the E-field, H-field, and the predicted current will 
improve the accuracy of a quick BoE equation by accounting 
for additional factors in the launch environment, at the very 
least, providing a reference upon which to base further 
decision-making.   
TABLE V.  VERIFICATION OF DB REDUCTION IN CURRENT.  
Steel Building Current Reduction 
Distance  Magnitude  Eqn. (1) Current 
Monitor a  
Decibel 
Difference   
400 m -82.5 kA 230 A 2.09 A -40.8 dB 
650 m -56.1 kA 96 A 1.63 A -35.4 dB 
2000 m b -52.1 kA 29 A 0.5 A -55.3 dB 
120 m -23.1 kA 214 A 9.64 A -26.9 dB 
a. The current monitor values are real measured values provided by a lightning monitoring system 
during actual lightning events. The table includes the associated distance and magnitude 
recorded by the same system for each strike.  
b. The strike with a distance of 2000m was recorded after rollout while the Launch Vehicle was 
underneath the catenary, making this an excellent, example of the S.E. provided by the catenary 
in an actual launch environment during a natural lightning flash.   
 
Fig. 3.  Catenary S.E. 
B. Catenary systms 
Most launch vehicles have some catenary systems designed 
to mitigate the effect of a nearby flash. This study used a 
typical configuration including four metal towers topped with 
an insulating material (providing a safer location for lightning 
attachment) and conducting wires connected between the 
towers and to ground (carrying current away from the vehicle 
underneath the structure.) In addition to this more obvious 
protection from direct attachment, the catenary provides some 
shielding from the incident electric and magnetic fields directly 
after a flash. Determining the amount of shielding was carried 
out through modeling in CST and validated with [13]. The 
predictions made in [13] imply a 21dB reduction in the 
magnetic field. A CST model, displayed in Figure 3, predicted 
a 20dB reduction for B-fields in the middle of the catenary. As 
with the facility shielding, a reduction can be made for a 
launch vehicle or spacecraft sitting under a catenary system 
before launch. Reducing a calculated result by 20dB to account 
for the catenary is a conservative estimate, since a real example 
in Table V shows S.E. of -55dB in current.  
C. Launch Tower 
Launch vehicles are generally accompanied by a launch 
tower before launch. This steel beam structure supports the 
vehicle itself and the umbilical cables terminated at the rocket, 
providing additional grounding points for the cable run. Some 
CST modeling (Figure 4) has shown that additional grounding 
points along the launch tower do not reduce the current 
observed on the over braid nor does the inclusion of multiple 
cable runs of various loop size all grounded on the launch 
tower. In modeling, we recommend using the largest loop 
attached to the launch vehicle grounded at the body of the 
rocket and a point on the ground plane that creates the desired 
loop area. While this is made of steel, a level of attenuation as 
seen with steel buildings is not expected due to the large 
aperture size between beams.  
 
Fig. 4.  Grounding Multiple Cables on Launch Tower 
 
TABLE VI.  LAUNCH TOWER S.E. 
Current Reduction due to Launch Tower 
Configuration Current (A) Current (dB 
Amps) 
With Tower 160 A 44 dB 
Without Tower 177 A 45 dB 
Difference 17 A -1 dB 
 
Table VI outlines the current difference based on the presence 
or absence of a launch tower. The S.E. calculated is 
insignificant at -1dB; calculations that do not include a launch 
tower will only be slightly conservative. It is not recommended 
to apply any reduction to equations (1), (2), or any model 
excluding the launch tower.  
V. MEASURED DATA COMPARISONS 
To add confidence in the CST results comparisons were 
made to currents coupled from a triggered lightning strike.  
Rocket-triggered lightning, described in [10], is an excellent 
validation example due to the well-defined magnitude and 
distance from the sample cable. In this case a 15kA strike was 
triggered 100m away from a 7m upright copper conductor. A 
current monitor on the conductor read a peak value of 7A 
during this triggered event. A similar model was created in 
CST using the specified magnitude, distance, and conductor. 
Fig 4 is the transient current induced on the conductor in the 
CST model also yielding a peak value of 8A.    
 
 
Fig. 5.  Current on 7m Vertical Copper Conductor.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS/ RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This study has shown some practical reductions and 
comparisons to simulated and measured results to support 
effective planning for launch readiness in the event of nearby 
lightning strikes.  Applying the standard deviations in Table I 
can account for error in range reports without severely over 
predicting the coupled currents with an error stacking method.   
The basic coupling methods used today are shown to be a 
reasonable worst case bound for nearby strikes but over 
conservative at all distances when compared with CST models. 
The rise times are typically not known from range data so the 
standard 6.4 µs rise time is often used.  Under that assumption, 
both (1) and (2) are conservative.  Significant shielding effect 
was also shown for standard launch vehicle facilities and 
catenary systems allowing simple equations and models to 
account for complicated elements of the launch environment. 
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